Militants
open a new front
By Khadim Hussain
DAWN
Tuesday, 10 Nov, 2009
A suicide attack in Adezai village
on the outskirts of Peshawar on Sunday killed a number of
people, including the Adezai nazim Abdul Malik. Responsibility
for the attack was claimed by the Taliban. The attack occurred
at the weekly cattle market in Adezai.
The attack appears to be part of a larger plan by the Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan in and around Darra Adamkhel and their allies in
Khyber Agency to demoralise the leadership and disrupt the
local organised resistance to the militants’ onslaught on
Peshawar from the south and south-west of the city.
The people of Thapa Momand (Badaber, Bazeedkhel,
Surezai and other small villages) and Thapa Koh-i-Damaan (Mathani,
Adezai, Pasani and other small villages) of the provincial
constituency PF-10 have organised a local lashkar through
a jirga in collaboration with the local police and provincial
administration for the last two years.
The lashkar has effectively kept the militant
organisations of Khyber Agency (Lashkar-i-Islam) and Darra
Adamkhel (TTP) at bay over the last two years. Had Badaber,
Adezai and Mathani fallen to the religious militant organisations,
the latter would have easily besieged Peshawar from all sides
long ago. Abdul Malik was one of the five staunch leaders
of the local lashkar which has been fighting for the security
of the provincial capital. The others are Khushdil Khan, MPA
PF-10; Gulzar Hussain, ex-nazim Badaber; Faheem Khan, nazim
Bazeedkhel; and Dilawar Khan of Adezai. All have been quite
effective in keeping up popular support for the lashkar and
forming a useful link between the local administration and
the lashkar.
Keeping in view the ongoing operation in
South Waziristan, it is not a far-fetched assumption that
militant organisations are prepared to open a new front in
the suburbs of Peshawar as they have effectively used the
strategy of opening new fronts in the past to keep the government
and security forces at bay.
While the military has focused its operation
on South Waziristan, the TTP and other militant organisations
are perceived to have moved mostly to North Waziristan and
Orakzai Agency. The latter is just a few dozen kilometres
to the south of Peshawar. Darra Adamkhel, where the presence
of the TTP had been quite strong, is just on the border of
Adezai.
The suicide bomber’s success in gaining access
to and killing Abdul Malik in a busy market raises several
questions in the minds of the local people. How could the
bomber reach Adezai if he had come from outside the village?
Did he come from the south (Darra Adamkhel) or from the west
(Khyber Agency)?
Both in Khyber Agency and Darra Adamkhel,
the military and the Frontier Constabulary are deployed on
the main routes through several check-posts. How could the
suicide bomber cross all these check-posts? The other possibility
is that the alleged suicide bomber was a local resident of
Adezai village. This assumption may not have validity if we
accept the claim of the success of the local lashkar against
militant networks.
Either both the civilian and the military
intelligence working in the area had no clue of the suicide
bomber entering the village from the south or the west or
one of them had some information but could not communicate
it to the other.
In the former case, updating and ensuring
the development of both civilian and military intelligence
networks is essential if Pakistan is to succeed in the insurgency
unleashed by the religious militant organisations with the
help of Al Qaeda and militant networks in Punjab.
If this is not seen to on an urgent basis,
the militant organisations will succeed in opening another
front in the suburbs of Peshawar by target killing the remaining
four leaders to dismantle the local lashkar. This may jeopardise
the provincial government and give the militant organisations
a golden opportunity to call the shots under the very nose
of the provincial establishment.
The possibility of intelligence not being
communicated by either network means that it is essential
that the military in Peshawar establish professional linkages
with the provincial police authorities in Peshawar under the
auspices of the provincial government. The provincial and
federal governments must immediately take measures to boost
the morale of the local lashkar besides improving their intelligence
networks and security apparatus.
Firstly, the bereaved family of Abdul Malik
must be financially supported both by the provincial and the
federal governments. Financial compensation must include both
expenses the family will incur due to the demise of their
elder and the expenditure Abdul Malik had already incurred
in the organisation of the local lashkar.
It is also suggested that the services of
Abdul Malik in organising the lashkar be posthumously recognised
by both the provincial and the federal government.
Secondly, the remaining four leaders of the
local lashkar must be provided with more government support
in organising and sustaining the local resistance to the militant
organisations. This may keep Peshawar away from the danger
of collapse as militant organisations continue to develop
their strategy of opening a new battlefront in the suburbs
of Peshawar.
It is a matter of grave concern to the people
of the NWFP that the federal government and the military have
yet to put forward a comprehensive strategy to defeat insurgency
and terrorism. The people in the province, and nowadays especially
in Peshawar, have been going through trauma and suffering
as suicide bombings and bomb blasts leave scores dead and
maimed.
Hundreds of innocent men, women and children
have fallen victim to such barbaric incidents across the length
and breadth of Pakistan’s north-west. The people now want
a comprehensive strategy to deal with the military, political,
economic and socio-cultural aspects of the militants’ onslaught
on their lives, their culture, their society and their state.
The writer teaches at Bahria University Islamabad
and coordinates the research activities of the Aryana Institute
for Regional Research and Advocacy.
khadim.2005@gmail.com
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